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General and complete disarmament

Nuclear disarmament

Follow-up to the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on the *Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons*

Reducing nuclear danger

Report of the Secretary-General

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* A/61/50 and Corr.1.

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I. Introduction

1. The present report is submitted pursuant to requests contained in the following resolutions adopted by the General Assembly at its sixtieth session on 8 December 2005: resolution 60/76, "Follow-up to the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on the *Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons*", resolution 60/79, "Reducing nuclear danger", and resolution 60/70, "Nuclear disarmament".

2. In paragraph 3 of resolution 60/76, the General Assembly requested all States to inform the Secretary-General of the efforts and measures they had taken on the implementation of the resolution and nuclear disarmament, and requested the Secretary-General to apprise the General Assembly of that information at its sixty-first session.

3. In paragraph 5 of resolution 60/79, the General Assembly requested the Secretary-General to intensify efforts and support initiatives that would contribute towards the full implementation of the seven recommendations identified by the Advisory Board on Disarmament Matters (see A/56/400) that would significantly reduce the risk of nuclear war and to continue to encourage Member States to endeavour to create conditions that would allow the emergence of an international consensus in favour of holding an international conference, as proposed in the United Nations Millennium Declaration, to identify ways of eliminating nuclear dangers, and to report thereon to General Assembly at its sixty-first session.

4. In paragraph 22 of resolution 60/70, the General Assembly requested the Secretary-General to submit to it, at its sixty-first session, a report on the implementation of the resolution.

II. Observations

5. Nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation remain priority issues for international peace and security. However, since mid-2005 there have been several disappointing setbacks in this regard, and nuclear disarmament efforts appear to have stalled. Yet the international community continues to confront dangers resulting from the development, acquisition, possession and possible use of weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear weapons and radiological dispersal devices, or "dirty bombs". Also, it has witnessed over recent years increasing challenges with regard to the compliance with International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards agreements, which add to concerns as regards the effectiveness of the non-proliferation regime. In order to reduce such threats, renewed efforts on unilateral, bilateral and multilateral levels are required. Measures to reduce existing nuclear arsenals by the nuclear-weapon States are essential and some progress has been made in that respect. However, it is of concern that at a time when progress is most needed, the emphasis seems to have shifted towards having fewer, but more powerful weapons. It is equally important that the international community continue its efforts to strengthen existing arms control and disarmament agreements by achieving universal adherence to, full compliance with, and effective implementation of their provisions.

6. Multilateral disarmament and non-proliferation regimes need to be upheld by their membership in order to be effective and the related functions fully discharged by their States parties. Despite the disappointing conclusion of the Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons in May 2005, with no agreement on substantive issues, the Treaty remains the cornerstone of the global non-proliferation regime and the essential foundation for the pursuit of nuclear disarmament. The divergence of views that prevented agreement at the Conference was also prevalent in the negotiations on the 2005 World Summit Outcome, resulting in no agreement on references to disarmament and non-proliferation in the Outcome. On both occasions, the opportunity to address a number of important threats and challenges to the international nuclear non-proliferation regime was missed. This sends an unfortunate signal regarding the current level of respect for the Treaty's authority. Action is therefore required on many fronts, including strengthening confidence in the integrity of the Treaty; achieving further irreversible cuts in nuclear arsenals; ensuring that measures for compliance are made more effective; acting to reduce the threat of proliferation not only to States, but to non-State actors; and finding durable ways to reconcile the right to peaceful uses of nuclear technology with the imperative of non-proliferation. In addition, it remains necessary to reduce the value of the perceived security benefits that the possession of nuclear weapons confers. The report of the independent Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission chaired by Hans Blix thus merits serious consideration by the international community, and much is expected from the seven-nation initiative led by Norway.

7. It is a welcome development that, owing to the recent ratification by Viet Nam of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, the number of States whose ratification is still required for the Treaty to enter into force has fallen. However, the issue of the pending entry into force of the Treaty had an impact on both the 2005 Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference and the 2005 World Summit, as one of the obstacles to those deliberations. The fourth Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty was held from 21 to 23 September 2005 in New York. The Conference adopted a Final Declaration stressing the importance of the Treaty and its entry into force as a practical step for the systematic and progressive efforts towards nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation. The Final Declaration also calls for the cessation of all nuclear-weapon test explosions and all other nuclear explosions, as an effective measure of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation in all its aspects. The Secretary-General reiterates his call on the States which have not yet signed and ratified the Treaty, especially those States whose ratification is necessary for the entry into force of the Treaty, to do so at the earliest possible date. Pending the entry into force of the Treaty, it is essential that the moratorium on nuclear-weapon test explosions and other nuclear explosions be maintained by States.

8. The Conference on Disarmament has yet to break the impasse to resume substantive work. It is critical that the Conference succeed in moving forward, particularly at a time when the validity of the multilateral disarmament machinery has been called into question. In his address to the Conference, on 21 June 2006, the Secretary-General noted that, for the first time in a decade, the Conference is working to an agreed schedule, with the result that there are structured debates on key issues. The Secretary-General further noted the proposals introduced by China and the Russian Federation on the prevention of an arms race in outer space, and

welcomed the elements of a ground-breaking instrument on halting the production of fissile materials for weapons purposes, proposed by the United States.

9. Full implementation of the seven recommendations identified by the Advisory Board on Disarmament Matters (see A/56/400), to reduce nuclear dangers, requires further efforts. In response to the request contained in General Assembly resolution 60/79, the Secretary-General continues to support initiatives and actions taken to that effect. With regard to the proposal contained in the United Nations Millennium Declaration, concerning an international conference to identify ways of eliminating nuclear dangers, consultations with Member States indicate that the conditions that would allow for the emergence of an international consensus to hold such a conference have yet to be created.

10. Ten years after the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on the *Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons* was issued on 8 July 1996, the threat of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, their means of delivery and related materials, as recently attested by the discovery of clandestine markets for nuclear technology, and the possibility that such weapons and materials may fall into the hands of terrorists have added to the challenges faced by multilateral disarmament efforts. Security Council resolution 1540 (2004) is aimed at preventing non-State actors from acquiring or developing weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery. Following the extension of the mandate of the 1540 Committee through Security Council resolution 1673 (2006), the United Nations Secretariat remains fully committed to assisting Member States in meeting these challenges, including providing secretarial support and technical assistance to the Committee established pursuant to Security Council resolution 1540 (2004).

III. Information received from Governments

11. As regards resolution 60/76, entitled "Follow-up to the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on the *Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons*", all Member States were invited, via a note verbale dated 17 February 2006, to inform the Secretary-General of the efforts and measures they had taken with regard to the implementation of the resolution. To date, replies have been received from Bolivia, Chile, Cuba, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Georgia, Japan and the Syrian Arab Republic, the texts of which are reproduced below. Any additional replies received from Member States will be issued as addenda to the present report.

Bolivia

[Original: Spanish]
[27 April 2006]

12. The Latin American and Caribbean region is not confronted with the terrible threat of the use or proliferation of nuclear weapons. However, Bolivia is conscious of the devastating impact that the use of such weapons anywhere in the world could have on all forms of life on Earth. It therefore supports any measure that might help to halt the proliferation and further development of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction.

13. In keeping with its pacifist policy and with global efforts to promote disarmament and non-proliferation, Bolivia supports the work being done by the international organizations of the United Nations system to promote disarmament and the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.

14. On 14 February 1967, Bolivia signed the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (Treaty of Tlatelolco), which was recognized around the world as the expression of the capacity of the countries of the region to act resolutely and independently to develop, negotiate and adopt collective measures for cooperation in the promotion of international peace and security. The Treaty of Tlatelolco has become fully established as a key element of the nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation scenario.

15. Bolivia, Brazil, Ecuador and Mexico worked together to promote the signing of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean and that process has been critically important to the complex task of constructing a peaceful world.

16. On the basis of article 7 of the Treaty of Tlatelolco, the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (OPANAL), to which Bolivia is also a State party, was established.

17. Bolivia's foreign policy is marked by its deep commitment to the promotion of international peace and security. Because membership of OPANAL is consistent with its peace policies, the Bolivian State became one of the promoters of this initiative, which protects the region from nuclear weapons and has transformed it into a nuclear-weapon-free zone. As a member of OPANAL, Bolivia is able to play a prominent and influential role in these matters at the regional and international levels.

18. The Treaty of Tlatelolco represents a practical contribution by our region to international peace and security and to global efforts to achieve disarmament and the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The work of OPANAL reflects the region's recognition of the fundamental importance of multilateralism and of international respect for the principles and provisions of the Charter of the United Nations and other international instruments.

19. The nature of current conflicts and the response of the international community are such that we must reflect on the concept of security and ensure, in particular, that it is multidimensional in character and not limited to the State. This has led to a proliferation of traditional ideas and has created the need for a comprehensive and binding security architecture. This new vision is based on the idea that various types of threat exist and that each nation must therefore determine the priority that it attaches to those threats, on a sovereign basis and within a framework of international cooperation. Disarmament must, therefore, play a central role in the system of collective security and coordinated action among States is essential.

Chile

[Original: Spanish]
[1 June 2006]

20. Chile welcomed the 1996 advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice interpreting article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), which imposes the obligation to pursue negotiations in good faith on total nuclear disarmament.

21. Although the 1995 NPT Review Conference indefinitely extended the Treaty, Chile, together with most other countries that are non-nuclear-weapon States, believes that this extension can in no way be interpreted as legitimizing the indefinite possession of such weapons by the nuclear-weapon States, but instead considers that the essential aim of the NPT is precisely to eliminate nuclear weapons.

22. The negotiation envisaged in article VI is an obligation both for States parties which possess nuclear weapons and for those which do not, but which suffer the effects of the use of such weapons.

23. The Declaration of Santiago de Chile adopted at the nineteenth regular session of the General Conference of OPANAL in November 2005 includes a call to the United Nations General Assembly, on the occasion of the tenth anniversary of the advisory opinion by the International Court of Justice on the *Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons*, to consider the actions that States should undertake to fulfil nuclear disarmament obligations emanating from the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and the 1996 advisory opinion.

Cuba

[Original: Spanish]
[30 May 2006]

24. Cuba believes that the use of nuclear weapons is completely immoral and cannot be justified by any concept or doctrine of security. It is indeed shameful that nuclear weapons still exist and that new and more sophisticated ones posing a serious threat to all humanity continue to be developed. The use of such weapons would have catastrophic consequences for all known forms of life on Earth. Their use would, moreover, constitute a flagrant violation of international standards on the prevention of genocide. Not only should the international community not forget the objective of the total elimination of nuclear weapons and the creation of a world free of such lethal weapons but it should also insist on compliance with the commitment to achieve it.

25. In utter disregard of the aspirations and rights of peoples to live in a secure and peaceful world, the new National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction of the United States of America contemplates, for the first time, the possibility of using nuclear weapons to respond to an attack with non-nuclear weapons. The most significant practical effect of this new concept is that nuclear weapons would no longer be a deterrent of last resort, to be used only in case of a nuclear attack or imminent threat of a nuclear attack but rather could be used in response to threats or attacks involving other types of weapons.

26. For non-nuclear-weapon States that are also parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, this situation gives cause for serious concern. They are being threatened with the use of nuclear weapons in flagrant violation of the assurances given by the nuclear Powers on the eve of the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the NPT. Those security guarantees were first provided individually by each of the permanent members of the Security Council of the United Nations and then ratified collectively with the adoption of Security Council resolution 984 (1995).

27. Cuba also expresses its profound concern at the lack of progress in acting on the 13 practical steps to implement the provisions of article VI of the NPT, agreed to at the 2000 Review Conference of the Parties.

28. Cuba further believes that nuclear deterrence is immoral, as it is a strategy based on the threat of real use. The philosophy that only the possession of nuclear weapons can guarantee security is completely false. Achieving the security of a State by threatening mass destruction is a corruption of the principles underpinning the most basic norms of human coexistence. The continued possession of nuclear weapons is an irresponsible incentive to proliferation, which heightens nuclear danger in the world.

29. Cuba is convinced, moreover, that the persistent development and refinement of nuclear weapons obviates the appeal by the international community in the Final Document of the tenth special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament for the urgent negotiation of agreements leading to the cessation of the development and qualitative refinement of nuclear-weapons systems with a view to the gradual and balanced reduction of nuclear weapons and their delivery systems and, ultimately, to their complete and final elimination as soon as possible.

30. Cuba calls on political and military decision makers to abandon this uncivilized strategy contrary to all ethical principles for one in which the means for achieving security are as important as its noble ends.

31. The cost of nuclear weapons and their technical infrastructure is exorbitant. The nuclear-weapons industry is responsible for the useless diversion of resources that could be channelled into worthwhile programmes such as development assistance, which, if implemented, would make a genuine contribution to international peace and security and to the well-being of all individuals and peoples.

32. Cuba recalls, once again, the vision in the Charter of the United Nations of the establishment and maintenance of international peace and security with the least possible diversion of the world's human and economic resources to armaments.

33. Cuba stresses the urgent need to commence multilateral negotiations leading to an early conclusion of a convention prohibiting the development, production, deployment, stockpiling, transfer, threat or use of nuclear weapons and providing for their elimination.

34. Cuba reaffirms its full commitment to a nuclear-weapon-free world and to making every effort to translate this aspiration into reality for all humanity.

35. Lastly, Cuba wishes to reiterate that the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice of 8 July 1996 on the legality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons is without any doubt an historic document in the field of nuclear disarmament and forms a legal basis that should be respected at all times.

Democratic People's Republic of Korea

[Original: English]
[17 March 2006]

36. Today, some nuclear-weapon States are pushing ahead with the qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons and developing new generations of nuclear-weapons systems under the doctrine of a nuclear pre-emptive strike, exposing world peace and security to grave threats. The gangster-like logic that only big powers can have nuclear weapons to threaten and attack small countries with them should not be connived at or tolerated any longer.

37. It is because none of the disarmament treaties, including the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, can guarantee the security of the non-nuclear-weapon States that a number of countries are strengthening their self-defensive capabilities.

38. The Democratic People's Republic of Korea has been compelled to choose the road to nuclear deterrence under the circumstances that the United States is stepping up its nuclear threat, aggravating relations between our countries to the extreme because of its deep-rooted hostile policy towards the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. The nuclear issue of the Korean peninsula is to be resolved spontaneously when we do not feel any threat as a result of the normalization of relations between us, providing that the United States has practically abandoned its hostile policy towards the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

39. The Democratic People's Republic of Korea demands that the nuclear-weapon States commit themselves to no first use of nuclear weapons by abrogating their nuclear doctrines of pre-emptive use of nuclear weapons and come to negotiations for international agreements in this regard.

Georgia

[Original: English]
[11 May 2006]

40. Georgia accords special attention to the problems of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and disarmament, as the most important means for guaranteeing international stability and combating the most dangerous threat to modern society — terrorism. Besides, Georgia calls upon all nuclear-weapon States to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals leading to nuclear disarmament, adopted at the 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

41. According to Georgian legislation the issue referred to in General Assembly resolution 60/76 are regulated by the Georgian law on the control on export-import of armaments, military equipment and goods of dual-purpose use, according to international and Georgian national security interests and the enforcement of regimes on the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. It defines fundamental aspects and rules of control on armaments, military equipment, raw materials, tools, technologies, scientific-technical information and import and export of services connected to their production and use.

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42. According to the law, export and import controls are those activities, the purpose of which is prevention, detection and elimination by State bodies of violations of rules of production under export and import controls making export, import, re-export and transit, subject to this law, other laws and normative acts.

43. The main principles for export and import controls are:

(a) Exercise of international obligations undertaken by Georgia on the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and other weapons;

(b) Prioritizing of political interests during the implementation of import and export controls;

(c) Verification of final uses of production under import and export controls under non-proliferation regimes;

(d) Accessibility of legal information on export and import controls.

44. According to the law, the following products come under export and import controls:

(a) Conventional armaments and technology, raw materials, materials, special equipment and technology, as well as services connected with their production;

(b) Nuclear materials, technologies, equipment, tools, special non-nuclear materials, dual-use goods, equipment, technologies, sources of radiation and isotopic production, the list of which is adopted by international non-proliferation regimes;

(c) Dual-use chemicals and technologies, which could be used for chemical weapons, according to the list adopted by international non-proliferation regimes;

(d) Pathogens, their genetic variations and forms and fragments of genetic materials, which could be used for bacteriological (biological) and toxic weapons, according to the list adopted by international non-proliferation regimes;

(e) Equipment, materials and technologies used for rocket weapons, according to the list, adopted by international non-proliferation regimes;

(f) Scientific-technical information, services and summary of intellectual properties linked to military goods;

(g) Other products, by decision of the President of Georgia.

Japan

[Original: English]
[1 May 2006]

Commitment to the three non-nuclear principles

45. The Government of Japan continues to firmly commit itself to the "three non-nuclear principles", which describes the policy of not possessing, not producing and not permitting the introduction of nuclear weapons into Japan. The successive Cabinets of Japan, including the incumbent cabinet under Prime Minister Koizumi, have repeatedly articulated that Japan will continue to uphold these principles.

Submission of resolutions on nuclear disarmament to the United Nations General Assembly

46. Since 1994, Japan has submitted its resolution on nuclear disarmament to the United Nations General Assembly.

47. The year 2005 marked the sixtieth anniversary of the atomic bombings. On this occasion, however, no substantial agreement was achieved at the 2005 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons in May as well as in the negotiation on the disarmament and non-proliferation section of the United Nations 2005 World Summit Outcome in September. In this situation, inspired by the strong national sentiment calling for the elimination of nuclear weapons, Japan, as the only nation in the world to have suffered atomic bombing, has strengthened the content of its draft resolution, while maintaining its basic position that places great importance on the realization of a peaceful and safe world free of nuclear weapons through a steady continuation of a practical and incremental approach towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons. On 9 December 2005, Japan's draft resolution on nuclear disarmament, "Renewed determination towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons" was adopted, at the Plenary Session of the United Nations General Assembly, by an overwhelming majority with support from the largest number of countries (168) since 1994.

48. Although the situation of nuclear disarmament remains challenging, Japan intends to pursue its various diplomatic efforts to maintain and reinforce the international disarmament and non-proliferation regime based on the Non-Proliferation Treaty, responding to the political will of a large majority of the international community, which was expressed through the adoption of this resolution.

Efforts for the early entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty

49. Japan emphasizes the importance of the early entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) which constitutes one of the major pillars of the Non-Proliferation Treaty regime. From this point of view Japan has made various efforts, including the following:

(a) Japan has seized every high-level opportunity to convince States that have not yet signed or ratified the CTBT, especially those States listed in annex II to the Treaty, of the importance of its early entry into force;

(b) In April 2005, prior to the 2005 Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Nobutaka Machimura, sent letters to 11 States whose ratification is required for the Treaty to enter into force;

(c) Ambassador Yukio Takasu, then Permanent Representative of Japan to the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO) Preparatory Commission, chaired a CTBT friends meeting in May 2005 in New York on the margin of the 2005 Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference;

(d) In September 2005, Tatsuo Arima, Special Envoy of the Government of Japan, attended the fourth Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the CTBT, and made a strong appeal to call for the signing and ratification of the CTBT as early as possible;

(e) In March 2006, the Government of Japan invited the relevant officials of the Government of Viet Nam to Japan to exchange views on the national implementation of the CTBT and make a study trip to the relevant international monitoring system facilities in Japan;

(f) As part of the establishment of the international monitoring system, the construction of domestic monitoring stations in Japan has been steadily progressing under the supervision of its CTBT national operation system. The three domestic monitoring stations were formally certified by the Provisional Technical Secretariat (PTS) of the CTBTO Preparatory Commission to date;

(g) In 2005 Japan invited 12 trainees for the technical assistance in the field of earthquake monitoring technology for the establishment of the international monitoring system in order to promote the entry into force of the CTBT. The total number of the participants in the training amounts to 107.

Activities in preparation for the commencement of negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty

50. Japan emphasizes the importance and urgency of the commencement of fissile material cut-off treaty negotiations. As a concrete contribution to this end, Japan presented, on 14 August 2003, a working paper on such a treaty to the Conference on Disarmament, aimed at deepening discussions on the substantive issues of the treaty, and facilitating the early commencement of negotiations.

51. Japan regards it as a primary task to reach an agreement on a programme of work at the Conference, thereby realizing the early commencement of negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty. Japan has been making its utmost efforts to break the current stalemate of the Conference on Disarmament.

Contribution to the 2005 Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Process

52. Japan attaches great importance to the Non-Proliferation Treaty regime and made tangible efforts for the success of the 2005 Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference:

(a) Prior to the Review Conference, in February 2005, Japan hosted the Tokyo Seminar on the Non-Proliferation Treaty entitled "Towards the 2005 Review Conference";

(b) In the Review Conference, Minister for Foreign Affairs Machimura made a statement on the first day of the Conference, stressing the importance of a successful outcome of the Review Conference;

(c) Japan submitted to the Conference a proposal entitled "Twenty-one Measures for the Twenty-first Century" (NPT/CONF.2005/WP.21), of which the nuclear disarmament-related section was jointly proposed by Australia, and Japan made every effort for these measures to be reflected in the final document. Japan also submitted a comprehensive working paper on its position on nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation (NPT/CONF.2005/WP.22) and two reports on nuclear disarmament (NPT/CONF.2005/19) and the implementation of the 1995 Middle East Resolution (NPT/CONF.2005/20) respectively. Furthermore, Japan and seven other countries jointly submitted a working paper on disarmament and non-proliferation education (NPT/CONF.2005/WP.30) and Japan submitted a

working paper entitled "Japan's Efforts in Disarmament and Non-Proliferation Education" (NPT/CONF.2005/WP.31);

(d) The Parliamentary Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Katsuyuki Kawai, attended the non-governmental organization session and invited the non-governmental organizations (NGOs) that attended the session to a reception which he hosted.

Cooperation for denuclearization in the Russian Federation

53. At the Kananaskis Summit in June 2002, Group of Eight leaders announced the "G-8 Global Partnership against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction" to address non-proliferation, disarmament, counter-terrorism and nuclear safety issues. Japan committed itself, for the purpose of the Partnership, to make a contribution amounting to a little more than 200 million United States dollars, out of which $100 million is to be allocated to the G-8 disposal programme of Russian surplus weapon-grade plutonium and the rest to projects for dismantling Russian decommissioned nuclear submarines. Meanwhile, with the cooperation of Japan, 20 kilograms of weapon-grade plutonium, equivalent to two to three nuclear warheads, was successfully disposed of for the first time in the world. In December 2003, Japan and the Russian Federation launched the first cooperation project to dismantle a Victor III class decommissioned nuclear submarine under the Partnership, which was successfully completed in December 2004. In November 2005, the implementing arrangement for dismantling five additional decommissioned nuclear submarines was signed.

Efforts to promote disarmament and non-proliferation education

54. In August 2002, the Group of Governmental Experts on Disarmament and Non-Proliferation Education submitted the report on disarmament and non-proliferation education to the United Nations Secretary-General. The resolution, requesting the implementation of the report, was adopted without a vote at the fifty-seventh session of the General Assembly.

55. Since 1983, Japan has invited more than 590 participants in the United Nations disarmament fellowship programme to Japan, including the cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, providing these young officials, who will be responsible for future disarmament diplomacy, with an opportunity to witness the horrendous and long-lasting consequences caused by atomic bombs. Japan will continue to contribute to the programme.

56. Japan believes that the international community should be well informed of the destructive effects of nuclear weapons. In accordance with the wish of the people of Japan that such weapons never be used again, the Government of Japan has supported, on a number of occasions, the efforts of local governments, non-governmental organizations, universities and various organizations to organize exhibitions relating to atomic bombs in foreign countries, including the Hiroshima-Nagasaki A-bomb exhibition in Paris, France in September 2005.

57. To elucidate the current state of disarmament and non-proliferation and to gain broad understanding and support of the issue, the Government of Japan published the third edition of a book entitled "Japan's Disarmament and Non-proliferation Policy" in March 2006.

58. In its efforts to implement the aforementioned recommendations suggested in the report, Japan has invited prominent educators on disarmament and non-proliferation to visit Japan since 2002. The educators lectured in Tokyo, Hiroshima and Nagasaki, on the necessity of weapons of mass destruction disarmament, especially nuclear disarmament. In February 2006, Japan invited an educator specializing in the field of the conventions on biological and chemical weapons, who gave a lecture on the importance of disarmament of bio/chemical weapons.

Syrian Arab Republic

[Original: Arabic]
[23 March 2006]

59. The advisory opinion issued by the International Court of Justice on 8 July 1996 affirmed that the unique characteristics of nuclear weapons, and in particular their destructive capacity, their capacity to cause untold human suffering, and their ability to cause damage to generations to come render them potentially catastrophic. The destructive power of nuclear weapons cannot be contained in either space or time. They have the potential to destroy all civilization and the entire ecosystem of the planet.

60. The Syrian Arab Republic, in accordance with the principles governing its policy of enhancing international peace and security and with the purposes and principles of the United Nations, and as part of its general perspective on complete and comprehensive disarmament, has spared no effort in supporting United Nations resolutions relating to disarmament. In 1968, it became a party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and agreed to be bound by its safeguards regime. The Syrian Arab Republic endorses General Assembly resolution 55/33 X, entitled "Follow-up to the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on the *Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons*", and it calls for the adoption of practical measures for the elaboration of a phased programme for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons within a specified time frame and under effective international supervision.

61. The Syrian Arab Republic is extremely concerned by the blatant violations of international legitimacy by some nuclear-weapons States, as well as by the development of new nuclear weapons and the threat of their use against States Parties to the NPT. It is also extremely concerned by the provision of aid to Israel, a non-party to the NPT that has unilaterally amassed a formidable nuclear arsenal about which the facts are being disclosed daily, and by the complicity of certain States in supplying Israel with the materials and technology needed to produce such weapons and thereby threaten the security of the region and its peoples, and consequently international peace and security.